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This study examines the consumption behaviour in Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) countries. It presents empirical evidence on rational expectations 
permanent income hypothesis (RE-PIH) and tests whether the phenomena of myopia, 
liquidity constraints or loss aversion impede forward-looking consumption behaviour. 
It also attempts to measure the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The empirical 
evidence defies the existence of consumption smoothing phenomena as postulated in 
RE-PIH. The results support loss aversion. The response of consumption to unexpected 
income changes is statistically significant in only one-third of the countries. In 
contrast, the response of consumption to expected income changes is statistically as 
well as economically significant in as many countries. The intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is also statistically insignificant in most of the countries and the elasticity is 
generally not positive. For the Islamic finance industry, the results help in explaining the 
low penetration of equity-based risk sharing instruments. From the policy perspective, 
the excess sensitivity of consumption to income suggests that redistribution efforts to 
enhance incomes of poor could help in enhancing their consumption levels.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, people desire to have smooth lifetime consumption. At the very start 
and back end of their lives, people in their non-working age usually have no or 
lower incomes. In the middle period of a lifetime, people are able to generate 
income from labour supply. They can make financial investments if income minus 
consumption leaves surplus endowments. The return on these investments can 
help them accumulate resources for retirement and to leave bequests. However, in 
all periods of life, people require consistent consumption.
Even in an Islamic framework, the consumer would want to achieve lifetime 
consumption smoothing in a relatively similar ‘smooth’ pattern. The difference 
comes in the choice of income generation and income allocation processes. A 
Muslim consumer with net endowment surplus has to follow certain restrictions in 
intertemporal consumption choices. For instance, Islamic principles prohibit Riba 
(interest), Gharar (uncertainty in speculative trades), Maysir (gambling) and certain 
sale transactions which do not fulfill the requirements of delivery, possession and 
specification of price. Hence, a Muslim consumer will have a different choice 
of investible assets and a limited set of trading strategies within which to make 
intertemporal consumption choices.
Furthermore, other factors may restrict the individuals to achieve consumption 
smoothing. For instance, if the income itself is not smooth and the financial 
services are not accessible to the masses; then, despite having the desire to achieve 
lifetime consumption smoothing, it may remain elusive for people with binding 
liquidity constraints. Low levels of income leave little surplus and savings. Hence, 
consumption may remain dependent on current incomes which can be highly 
volatile for informal industrial workers and farmers. In countries like Burkina 
Faso, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Niger and Bangladesh, the share of agriculture 
employment as a proportion of total employment stands at 84%, 68%, 65%, 56%, 
48%, 44% and 43% respectively.
On the other hand, voluntary exclusion from financial services can create 
liquidity constraints. Muslims are significantly less likely than non-Muslims to 
own a formal account or save at a formal interest based financial institution after 
controlling for other individual and country-level characteristics (Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., 2013). In countries like Afghanistan, Morocco, Iraq, Niger and Djibouti, the 
percentage of adult population with no bank accounts for religious reasons stands 
at 33.6%, 26.8%, 25.6%, 23.6% and 22.8%, respectively. 
On the positive side, Akerlof (2007) suggests that social norms could provide 
motivation for actions. There is strong incentive mechanism for pure altruism 
in Islamic worldview. Islamic principles make every wealthy Muslim liable to 
share a portion of his/her wealth with the poor in society. Thus, altruism and 
philanthropic endowments provide a social safety net to the poor and needy. 
Thus, some of the liquidity constrained poor households could find necessary 
support from social finance even if they are unable to access the formal financial 
institutions and remain underserved by weakly funded public support programs 
(Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2010). 
Thus, these distinct characteristic features of OIC countries make it interesting 
to explore consumption behaviour in OIC countries. This study explores the 
consumption behaviour in selected OIC countries by examining the evidence 
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for forward-looking consumption behaviour and the strength of intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution. Finally, this study investigates the response in 
consumption due to expected and unexpected income changes to investigate the 
excess sensitivity and excess smoothness phenomena in OIC countries.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In consumer theory, Absolute Income Hypothesis (AIH) is a pioneer attempt to 
explain consumption behaviour. AIH postulates that consumption is a function 
of current income and that marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is positive but 
less than 1. As a result, average propensity to consume (APC) would fall with 
successive increases in income (Keynes, 1935). The economic implication is that in 
response to an increase in income; richer households would relatively save more 
than the poorer households. Early cross-sectional studies and short-term time 
series results gave credence to this hypothesis (Williams & Zimmerman; Stigler, 
1954). Even contemporary empirical cross-sectional studies, such as by Lusardi 
(1992) and Souleles (1995) also find similar results and conclude that the MPC is 
considerably higher for consumers with low wealth or low income as compared 
to consumers with high wealth or high income. Murugasu et al. (2013) in a study 
for Malaysia find that the MPC for lower income groups is higher than the MPC 
for higher income households. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) provide empirical 
evidence from Italy which shows that households with low cash-on-hand exhibit 
a much higher MPC than affluent households.
Nevertheless, the long-term time series data defied the proposition of falling 
APC (Kuznets et al., 1946). Hence, to reconcile cross-sectional and long-term time 
series evidence, economists tried to build micro-foundations for the consumer 
behaviour. To build the theoretical foundation on this vision, it was posited that 
the consumer behaves in an intertemporal context whereby his consumption 
is a function of lifetime resources and not just current income (Fisher, 1930). 
Permanent income hypothesis (PIH) contends that consumption is a function of 
permanent income (Friedman, 1957). Changes in permanent income would affect 
consumption, but changes in transitory income would mostly be saved (Friedman, 
1957). In the lifecycle consumption hypothesis (LCH), the consumption is based 
on lifetime resources (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954; Ando & Modigliani, 1963). 
Since then, this brand of research has stimulated exciting ideas, especially after 
the Lucas (1976) critique and increased emphasis on micro-foundations in modern 
macroeconomics.
To empirically test the implications of PIH, Hall (1978) contends that 
consumption is a random walk. Hall’s (1978) random walk hypothesis implies that 
unexpected changes in permanent income can affect current consumption, but 
expected changes in income do not have any explanatory power. Later empirical 
studies tested Hall’s random walk hypothesis, but they found contradictory 
evidence. Flavin (1981) observes that changes in current income have explanatory 
power and termed such phenomenon as “excess sensitivity of consumption” 
(Flavin, 1985). Other studies in this brand of research include Hayashi (1982), 
Bernanke (1985), Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Shea (1995). Campbell and 
Mankiw (1990) show that in an economy, consumers can satisfy both AIH and 
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PIH simultaneously. Some fraction of the consumers can be forward-looking 
consumers and some fraction of the consumers may simply spend their current 
income. Their estimates show that roughly half of the consumers do not exhibit 
forward-looking consumption behaviour. Roche (1995) also find that PIH holds 
for only about 50% of the consumers. Virad (1997) confirms that the empirical 
evidence supports excess sensitivity of consumption to current disposable income, 
rather than to time-varying real interest rates or non-separable utility. Later studies 
explain the reasons for the rejection of PIH. Flavin (1985), Zeldes (1989) and Japelli 
and Pagano (1989) identify liquidity constraints as one possible reason while 
Runkle (1991) identify myopia as the reason why PIH fails in real-world consumer 
behaviour. Deaton (1991) argues that most households exhibit buffer-stock saving 
behaviour while Wolff (1998) contends that most households have little wealth. 
Shea (1995) finds evidence of loss aversion for the United States. 
In a cross-country research, Bowman et al. (1999) present evidence supporting 
loss aversion from OECD countries. Juan and Seater (1997) conclude from their 
cross-country test of PIH that data from industrial countries support PIH, but 
data from developing countries does not. Olekalns (1997) establishes that PIH 
is rejected in Australia due to liquidity constraints for the period in which the 
financial system was regulated. Drakos (2002) documents the empirical failure 
of the PIH in Greece. The empirical findings imply that this failure is due to the 
presence of liquidity constraints rather than myopia. Gomes and Paz (2010) test the 
PIH for Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. They find that liquidity constraints 
explain the failure of PIH in Brazil and Colombia, while loss aversion explains the 
failure of PIH in Peru. Thus, despite a solid theoretical foundation, there has been 
mixed evidence on PIH.  
Among the OIC countries, Khan and Nishat (2011) show the strong validity of 
AIH rather than PIH for Pakistan. Their evidence points towards the existence of 
liquidity constraints. Yazdan and Sina (2013) also provide evidence against PIH 
for Iran. On the other hand, Bilgili and Bagl (2016) establish that consumption 
in Turkey is responsive to both expected and unexpected income changes. In a 
cross-country study, Juan and Seater (1997) find that current income innovations 
lead consumers to revise their current consumption in OIC countries, such as in 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Comoros, Gabon, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordon, Malaysia, 
Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Suriname, Syria and Tunisia. However, the 
data in that study pertains to the very early period when the Muslim majority 
countries in Central Asia had not gained independence and when Islamic banking 
did not even exist in most of the Muslim majority countries. For Muslim majority 
countries, the absence of interest based financial intermediation, high incidence of 
poverty, high proportion of employment in informal and agricultural occupations 
and replacement of financial with social institutions warrants an empirical 
examination of consumption behaviour. This study aims to fulfill that objective. 
The next section gives an account of the research methodology adopted to fulfill 
the aims of the study.
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Rational Expectations Permanent Income Hypothesis (RE-PIH) Model
This study uses the Rational Expectations Permanent Income Hypothesis (RE-
PIH) for analyzing consumption behaviour since this model is microfounded 
and incorporates forward-looking intertemporal consumption behaviour. Below, 
a brief mathematical presentation of the model is provided. The representative 
consumer maximizes the following utility function:
Subject to: 
Where,
Ct = Private consumption at period t.
Et = Expectations formed subject to information at period t.
T = Total time period of life.
Yt = Disposable labour income at period t.  
At = Lifetime resources excluding human capital at period t. 
ρ = Rate of subjective time preference.
r = Rate of profit.
u’>0 implies that the marginal utility of consumption is positive and u’’<0 
implies diminishing marginal utility. It is assumed that households can invest 
and access finance at the markup rate r. The standard Euler equation from the 
maximization of the utility function yields:
, (1)
It is further assumed that r=δ. If the marginal utility u’ is linear or log linear, 
then an interesting result appears in which current consumption is the best forecast 
of future consumption in the next period, i.e.:
(2)
If expectation is taken on both sides, it becomes:
(3)
It is because of E[et]=0
Using equation (3), it can be shown that consumption is a random walk.
(4)
(5)
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To test the PIH, the following empirical model is used:
(6)
Where, 
Ct  = Natural log of household real consumption per capita. 
∆Ct  = The Growth rate of household real consumption per capita.
Yt  = Natural log of real Zakat adjusted income per capita. 
∆Yt  = The Growth rate of real Zakat adjusted income per capita.
Previous studies in OIC countries have not adjusted the budget constraint 
for Zakat. This study incorporates this adjustment by deducting 2.5% of real per 
capita income as Zakat from the unadjusted real per capita income. As per RE-
PIH model, changes in current income shall not determine current consumption. If 
λ=0, then, PIH will be satisfied. Campbell and Mankiw (1990) also control for time 
variation in in the terest rate. Then, the extended model becomes:
(7)
Where rt is the real profit rate in period t.
Under the phenomenon of myopia, the myopic consumers consume a fixed 
share of current income. Therefore, consumption should respond symmetrically 
to the increases as well as decreases in expected income. On the other hand, if 
liquidity constraints are binding, individual consumption should respond more 
strongly to the increase in expected income than to the decrease in expected 
income. The asymmetrical behaviour under binding liquidity constraints restricts 
individuals from borrowing, especially when incomes are declining. However, 
they can save freely in all periods. Under loss aversion, people tend to avoid 
the risk of loss. Using the methodology adopted by Shea (1995), the presence of 
liquidity constraints, myopia or loss aversion is tested by using the following 
regression model:
(8)
Here, POS and NEG are dummy variables. POS takes the value of 1 when 
income changes are positive and zero otherwise. NEG takes the value of 1 when 
income changes are negative and zero otherwise.  Table 1 summarizes the testable 
hypotheses. 
(9)
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Volume 4, Number 1, August 2018 107
In addition to that, Flavin’s (1981) empirical approach is used to explore the 
response in consumption due to expected and unexpected income changes. The 
following model specification is used to test for this conjecture for each of the 
countries.
Table 1.
Testable Hypotheses
Conjectures Validation Criteria
RE-PIH Holds λ1=λ2=0
RE-PIH Fails Due to Myopia λ1=λ2
λ1>0,λ2>0
RE-PIH Fails Due to Liquidity Constraints λ1>λ2
λ1>0,λ2>0
RE-PIH Fails Due to Loss Aversion λ1<λ2
λ1>0,λ2>0
Here, ∆Ct is the difference in log of real consumption. EYt is an estimate of 
expected income. Yt-EYt is an estimate of unexpected income. RE-PIH implies 
that consumption shall only respond to the unexpected changes in income and 
not to the expected changes in income. If φ2 is statistically significant while φ3 is 
statistically insignificant, then this result would be consistent with RE-PIH. If φ3 is 
statistically significant, it implies that there is ‘excess sensitivity’ in consumption 
with regards to changes in expected income. If φ2 is insignificant, it implies that 
there is ‘excess smoothness’ in consumption since it does not change even due to 
unexpected changes in income. 
Finally, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is computed by using Hall’s 
(1988) approach. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution can be estimated as 
the response of rate of change of consumption to changes in the real rate of return. 
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is indistinguishable from zero, then 
it would imply that the net effect of changes in real returns on consumption is 
negligible.
3.2. Data Collection
The data for this study is obtained from the World Development Indicators 2015. 
The period of study is 1970-2013. In total, 32 OIC member countries are selected 
where data is sufficiently available. 
3.3. Research Methods
Standard econometric tools and testing procedures are used to account for 
stationarity and autocorrelation. For panel data analysis, the Hausman test is 
(10)
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used to decide between fixed effects and random effects model. Panel unit root is 
checked using Im-Pesaran-Shin test and Fisher-type tests. For time series data, the 
unit root is checked using Augmented Ducky-Fuller (ADF), Phillips Perron and 
Dickey Fuller-Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) tests. 
Using the different instruments list, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
Instrumental Variable (IV) regression, Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation frameworks are 
employed. Over-identifying restrictions are tested using Sargan’s and Basmann’s 
chi-square tests for 2SLS, Anderson-Rubin likelihood-ratio test and Basmann’s F 
test for LIML and Hansen’s J statistic for GMM. The instruments lists of Campbell 
and Mankiw (1990) are used to account for the endogeneity problem in estimation. 
The variables used in various instruments lists are mentioned in Table 2 below.
Table 2.
Instruments Lists Used in Estimation
Instrument List Instrument Variables
1 ∆Yt-2,∆Yt-3,∆Yt-4,∆Yt-5,∆Yt-6
2 ∆Ct-2,∆Ct-3,∆Ct-4,∆Ct-5,∆Ct-6
3 ∆it-2,∆it-3,∆it-4,∆it-5,∆it-6
4 ∆Yt-2,∆Yt-3,∆Yt-4,∆Ct-2,∆Ct-3,∆Ct-4
5 ∆Yt-2,∆Yt-3,∆Yt-4,∆Ct-2,∆Ct-3,∆Ct-4, ∆it-2,∆it-3,∆it-4
For examining the response in consumption due to expected and unexpected 
income changes, time series of expected and unexpected income changes is 
estimated. For generating expected income series, Autoregressive Integrated 
Moving Average (ARIMA) is applied with a suitable identification scheme for each 
of the OIC countries. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULT AND ANALYSIS
This section presents and analyzes the empirical findings. The estimates from 
panel data regression of equation (7), (8) and (9) appear in Table 3 in Appendix. 
The empirical evidence challenges the existence of consumption smoothing 
phenomena as postulated in PIH. The estimated coefficients on income ( ,  and 
) are positive and statistically significant in all estimation frameworks. Support 
for the phenomenon of myopia or liquidity constraints is also not found. Since 
the estimated coefficient on  is generally not equal to , it is concluded that the 
households in OIC countries are not myopic. On the other hand, the coefficient 
on  is generally lower than  which implies that the households do not deviate 
from consumption smoothing because of liquidity constraints. However, the 
evidence supports the phenomenon of loss aversion. 
Under loss aversion, when people receive good news about expected rise in the 
income, they adjust current consumption upward immediately, thereby reducing 
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the possibility of a further increase in future consumption. On the other hand, when 
people receive bad news about expected fall in income, they do not change current 
consumption, thereby enhancing the possibility of slide in future consumption if 
this expectation is realized (Treeck, 2010; Johansson, 2002). Shea (1995) explains 
that loss-averse households may refuse to reduce consumption today in the 
face of expected, but uncertain declines in future income. Consumers with such 
preferences suffer large psychic losses when forced to cut living standards. 
Bowman et al. (1999) explain that when people get accustomed to a particular level 
of consumption, they feel a greater sense of loss when they are deprived to achieve 
the reference point consumption level. Treeck (2010) explains that if consumers 
engage in conspicuous consumption, then they may delay lowering consumption 
‘to keep up with the Joneses’. Nonetheless, when the income actually does decline, 
they are forced to change their consumption. On the other hand, Gomes (2014) 
explains that loss aversion can be interpreted as uncertainty aversion whereby 
uncertainty is higher when income falls. 
Prospect theory also explains this phenomenon as people feel more strongly 
about the pain from a loss than the pleasure from an equal amount of gain 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Perez (2000) provides an alternate explanation by 
assuming that income increases consistently until retirement, but there is no income 
after retirement. He further assumes that the expected increase in income can relax 
liquidity constraints, but an expected decrease in income cannot. In that case, if 
the consumer faces liquidity constraints in youth while expecting an increase in 
income in subsequent years until retirement, then he will save during youth and 
may not increase his consumption as much. This can explain the quantitatively 
lesser coefficient for the expected increase in income as compared to the coefficient 
for the expected decrease in income. 
From the Islamic finance industry perspective, loss aversion can possibly 
explain the nature of financial intermediation in OIC countries as they rely mostly 
on a less risky bank-based finance as compared to capital markets. Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) contend that loss aversion can explain under-investment in risky 
assets. It can also partially explain why the actual use of equity-based modes of 
financing is lower in OIC countries despite the ideological preference for these 
modes. The results can provide a behavioral explanation of why equity financing 
with the high risk-high return is less preferred in commercial product offerings. 
It is because the consumers have high loss aversion due to which they put greater 
weight on negative losses than on the positive gains in intertemporal consumption 
choices. That is why, Islamic banks as agents and delegated monitors for loss-
averse Muslim savers predominantly use less-risky Shari’ah compliant financing 
contracts. Loss aversion implies that it would be better to target redistribution 
through social finance institutions like Zakat, Waqf and Qard-e-Hassan since 
commercial finance institutions would be hesitant to use equity financing 
instruments given high loss aversion.                   
Table 4 in Appendix presents the results of equation (10). In 11 out of 28 
countries where the data is available for at least since 1990, consumption does 
respond to expected income. This is against the intuition implied by PIH. As per 
PIH, consumption should only respond to unanticipated income changes and not 
to expected income changes. In 10 out of 28 countries where the data is available 
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for at least since 1990, consumption responds to unexpected income changes. In 
relatively developed OIC countries like Malaysia and Turkey where the financial 
outreach is considerably more widespread, and incidence of poverty is lower, the 
consumption responds to unexpected income changes and not to expected income 
changes.      
Finally, Table 5 in Appendix gives the estimates of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution. The results suggest that in most countries, the consumption does 
not respond to the real rate of return. In 2 of the 4 countries where the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution is significant, the estimate is negative, i.e. -0.35 and -0.17 
in Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively. In 2 of the other 4 countries where the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is significant, the estimate is positive, but 
significantly less than 1, i.e. 0.16 and 0.37 in Lebanon and Guyana respectively. 
In other countries, the estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 
not significant. Havránek (2015) reviews 169 studies and concludes that the mean 
estimate is near zero. For OIC countries, these results are plausible since most of 
the OIC countries are poor countries where the majority of the population does 
not have enough wealth to engage in forward-looking intertemporal consumption 
behaviour. Guvenen (2000) explains that such results appear because consumption 
is much more evenly distributed across households than is wealth. Poor households 
are in majority and these poor households usually do not have surplus resources to 
invest and thus, changes in real returns do not affect their behaviour significantly. 
V. CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this study challenges the existence of consumption 
smoothing phenomena as postulated in permanent income hypothesis (PIH). 
The evidence suggests that loss aversion impedes forward-looking consumption 
behaviour. Furthermore, in several countries, the consumption responds to 
expected income changes, which is against the intuition implied by PIH. The 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is also statistically insignificant in most of 
the OIC countries and there is no strong evidence that the elasticity is generally 
positive. The phenomenon of loss aversion could explain the low penetration of 
equity-based risk-sharing instruments. The excess sensitivity of consumption to 
income suggests that redistribution efforts to enhance incomes of poor households 
could help in enhancing their consumption levels. Thus, income redistribution 
and financial inclusion policies could be effective in enabling the households to 
smooth incomes and subsequently consumption.
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Model ∆Ct=α+λ∆Yt+et ∆Ct=μ+δ∆Yt+θrt +et ∆Ct=τ+λ1 P∆Yt+λ2 N∆Yt+σrt+et
Estimators α λ R2 μ δ θ R2 τ λ1 λ2 σ R2
GLS 0.001 .788** 0.001 .788** 0.038 0.004 .643** .896** 0.031
MLE 0.001 .788** 0.001 .788** 0.037 0.004 .642** .896** 0.031
Instrumental Variable Regression (Fixed Effects)
IV (1a) 0.005 .609** 0.47 -0.014 .729** 0.936 0.19 -0.014 .733** .722** 0.952 0.19
IV (1b) -0.372 .831** 0.946 0.1 -0.414 .698** .929** 1.06 0.1
IV (1c) -0.004 .819** 0.000 0.46 -0.004 .701** .900** 0.000 0.45
IV (2a) 0.001 .860** 0.47 -0.006 .777** 0.449 0.35 -0.004 .716** .820** 0.452 0.36
IV (2b) -0.353 .830** 0.899 0.12 -0.357 .698** .925** 0.916 0.12
IV (2c) -0.025 .806** 0.0001 0.26 -0.019 .702** .883** 0.000 0.28
IV (3a) 0.017 0.037 0.47 0.003 .835** -0.134 0.44 0.006 .697** .931** -0.115 0.45
IV (3b) 1.22 .792** -3.08 0.0004 1.25 .709** .851** -3.17 0.005
IV (3c) -0.244 0.671 0.0004 0.008 -0.26 .714** .625** 0.001 0.007
IV (4a) -0.001 .906** 0.45 -0.004 .783** 0.338 0.38 -0.001 .691** .850** 0.332 0.38
IV (4b) -0.413 .821** 1.038 0.08 -0.587 .659** .945** 1.48 0.06
IV (4c) -0.017 .803** 0.000 0.31 -0.015 .680** .891** 0.000 0.31
IV (5a) 0.001 .828** 0.45 -0.002 .789** 0.267 0.4 -0.001 .689** .861** 0.275 0.41
IV (5b) -0.401 .821** 1.01 0.09 -0.578 .660** .945** 1.46 0.06
IV (5c) -0.018 .802** -0.018 0.31 -0.017 .680** .889** 0.000 0.29
Instrumental Variable Regression (GLS Random Effects)
IV (1a) 0.001 .846** 0.47 0.002 .822** -0.027 0.47 0.006 .694** .932** -0.136 0.45
IV (1b) -0.007 .810** 0.023 0.46 -0.007 .680** .899** 0.029 0.47
IV (1c) 0.002 .819** 0.000 0.47 0.006 .695** .909** 0.000 0.47
IV (2a) -0.005 1.16** 0.47 -0.002 .798** 0.23 0.44 -0.001 .707** .862** 0.237 0.44
IV (2b) -0.038 .776** 0.101 0.43 -0.035 .629** .882** 0.103 0.44
IV (2c) -0.041 .830** 0.0001 0.16 -0.04 .792** .857** 0.000 0.16
IV (3a) 0.013 0.249 0.47 0.004 .832** -0.138 0.44 0.006 .695** .928** -0.114 0.45
IV (3b) 0.028 .849** -0.069 0.46 0.028 .743** .922** -0.064 0.47
IV (3c) -0.031 .827** 0.000 0.22 -0.037 .785** .861** 0.000 0.17
IV (4a) 0.001 .822** 0.45 0.001 .798** 0.037 0.45 0.003 .660** .897** 0.058 0.46
IV (4b) 0.004 .804** -0.005 0.45 0.001 .651** .906** 0.008 0.46
IV (4c) -0.043 .820** 0.000 0.14 -0.035 .742** .873** 0.000 0.17
IV (5a) 0.002 .803** 0.45 0.001 .795** 0.073 0.45 0.002 .661** .890** 0.099 0.46
IV (5b) 0.004 .804** -0.005 0.45 0.002 .653** .906** 0.006 0.46
IV (5c) -0.029 .814** 0.000 0.21 -0.023 .717** .884** 0.000 0.25
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Instrumental Variable Regression (Between Effects)
IV (1a) 0.002 .793** 0.47 0.001 .800** 0.061 0.47 0.007 .644** .939** -0.123 0.45
IV (1b) 0.009 .915** -0.025 0.47 .014** .906** 1.02** -0.035 0.47
IV (1c) 0.001 .807** 0.000 0.47 0.004 .658** .936** 0.000 0.48
IV (2a) -0.001 .922** 0.47 0.004 .797** -0.11 0.44 0.007 .645** .939** -0.099 0.46
IV (2b) .020** 1.06** -.058** 0.47 .016** .978** 1.03** -0.045 0.47
IV (2c) -0.001 .824** -0.001 0.47 0.001 .709** .926** 0.000 0.48
IV (3a) 0.003 .786** 0.47 0.005 .796** -0.182 0.42 0.008 .641** .940** -0.174 0.43
IV (3b) 0.005 .846** -0.01 0.47 0.004 .615** .928** 0.005 0.47
IV (3c) -0.009 .875** 0.000 0.43 -0.006 .823** .903** 0.000 0.45
IV (4a) 0.004 .717** 0.45 0.005 .721** -0.087 0.43 .010** .476** .950** -0.083 0.44
IV (4b) .033** 1.17** -.09** 0.45 .029** 1.13** 1.11** -.087** 0.45
IV (4c) 0.004 .715** 0.000 0.45 .009** .466** .942** 0.000 0.45
IV (5a) 0.004 .719** 0.45 0.005 .721** -0.078 0.44 .010** .478** .951** -0.104 0.43
IV (5b) .026** 1.06** -.07** 0.45 .025** 1.01** 1.08** -.07** 0.46
IV (5c) 0.004 .715** 0.000 0.45 .009** .469** .942** 0.000 0.45
*Statistical significance at 10% level. **Statistical significance at 5% level. 
IV a) uses real interest rate, IV b) uses labour supply and IV c) uses government real consumption as 
regressors. Labor supply and government real consumption are used in place of real interest rate to test for 
nonseparability in the utility function.
Table 3: Continued
Estimation Results for Panel Data of OIC Countries – 
Equation (7, 8 and 9)
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Model
Time 
PeriodCountry / 
Estimators φ φ1 φ2 φ3
Adjusted 
R2
ARIMA 
(p, d, q)
Algeria 1974–2013 -1.06** -0.23** 0.00 0.34** 0.17 (1,1,1)
Bangladesh 1981–2013 3.70** -0.45** 0.00** -0.23 0.37 (1,1,1)
Benin 1981–2013 -0.01 -1.07** -0.00** 1.06** 0.69 (1,1,1)
Burkina Faso  1970–2013 1.76 -0.46** 0.00 0.12 0.24 (1,1,0)
Cameroon 1970–2013 0.42 -0.05 0.00 -0.007 0.03 (1,1,1)
Chad 1981–2013 1.68 -0.37** -0.00 0.036 0.22 (0,1,1)
Egypt 1970–2013 0.15 -0.37** 0.00 0.34** 0.29 (1,1,1)
Gabon 1970–2013 0.97 -0.33** -0.00 0.19** 0.23 (1,1,0)
Guinea-Bissau 1990–2013 -1.11 -0.86** 0.00 0.99** 0.34 (1,1,1)
Guyana 1981–2013 0.83 -0.28 0.00 0.11 0.27 (1,1,1)
Indonesia 1990–2013 1.85 -0.22** 0.00 -0.07 0.50 (0,1,1)
Jordan 1970–2013 -0.10 -0.42** 0.00 0.43** 0.14 (1,1,1)
Kuwait 1975–2013 1.21 -0.41** 0.00 0.25** 0.41 (1,1,1)
Lebanon 1981–2013 5.65** -1.13** 0.00** 0.44* 0.54 (1,1,1)
Libya 1970–2013 2.67** -1.21** 0.00** 0.63** 0.60 (1,1,1)
Malaysia 1970–2013 1.65** -0.34** 0.00** 0.09 0.27 (1,1,1)
Mali 1981–2013 1.93* -0.62** -0.00 0.28 0.31 (1,1,1)
Mauritania 1980–2013 1.23 -0.49** 0.00 0.28 0.23 (0,1,1)
Morocco 1970–2013 6.34** -0.85** 0.00 -0.12* 0.64 (1,1,0)
Niger 1970–2013 1.94** -0.59** 0.00** 0.19 0.32 (0,1,1)
Nigeria 1970–2013 2.79** -0.61** 0.00** 0.15 0.28 (1,1,1)
Oman 1980–2013 2.52 -0.15 0.00 -0.14 0.07 (0,1,2)
Pakistan 1970–2013 0.87* -0.38** 0.00 0.22 0.16 (1,1,0)
Senegal 1970–2013 0.59 -0.17 0.00** 0.07 0.13 (1,1,1)
Syria 1970–2013 2.98** -0.37* 0.00 -0.07 0.24 (1,1,1)
Togo 1970–2013 3.82** -0.81** 0.00** 0.12 0.46 (1,1,1)
Turkey 1970–2013 4.08** -0.65** 0.00** 0.12 0.39 (1,1,1)
Uganda 1990–2013 -1.09 -0.84** -0.00 1.00** 0.34 (1,1,1)
*Statistical significance at 10% level. **Statistical significance at 5% level.
Table 4
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Country Time Period
Estimate of Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
2SLS LIML GMM
Algeria 1974–2013 0.33 0.45 0.33
Bangladesh 1981–2013 -0.44 -0.50 -0.35**
Benin 1981–2013 -0.08 -0.51 -0.19
Burkina Faso  1970–2013 -0.77 -1.59 -0.15
Cameroon 1970–2013 -0.60 -1.93 -0.45
Chad 1981–2013 -0.27 -0.38 -0.25
Egypt 1970–2013 0.017 0.018 0.018
Gabon 1970–2013 -1.54 -1.61 -1.46
Guinea-Bissau 1990–2013 0.095 0.15 -0.048
Guyana 1981–2013 0.18 0.19 0.16*
Indonesia 1990–2013 -0.03 -0.11 -0.10
Jordan 1970–2013 -0.32 -0.38 -0.31
Kuwait 1975–2013 0.54 0.53 0.55
Lebanon 1981–2013 0.37* 0.38* 0.34
Libya 1970–2013 1.92 4.09 1.31
Malaysia 1970–2013 -2.71 -5.49 -3.05
Mali 1981–2013 0.11 0.16 0.06
Mauritania 1980–2013 -0.04 -0.06 0.07
Morocco 1970–2013 0.04 0.06 0.17
Niger 1970–2013 -0.58 -0.69 -0.75
Nigeria 1970–2013 -0.70 -2.08 -0.83
Oman 1980–2013 -3.12 -3.87 -2.90
Pakistan 1970–2013 -0.18 -0.19 -0.17*
Senegal 1970–2013 -0.49 -1.15 -0.15
Syria 1970–2013 0.61 0.69 0.60
Togo 1970–2013 -1.19 -1.92 -1.29
Turkey 1970–2013 0.02 0.02 0.03
Uganda 1990–2013 0.47 8.23 0.15
*Statistical significance at 10% level. **Statistical significance at 5% level. 
Lagged nominal interest rate, lagged real interest rate and lagged change in log consumption are used as 
instruments.
Table 5
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
